Appellant’s exculpation from the offense of rape does not mean, however, that his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. Complainant’s narration of facts, i.e., appellant’s sexual abuse of his own 12-year old daughter twice on 13 June 1998, clearly establishes the offense of qualified seduction. This offense is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years but under 18 years of age and committed by any person in public authority, a priest, house-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman, but that, if the offender is the brother or ascendant of the victim, the latter’s virginity or age, becomes immaterial. The crime of qualified seduction has the following elements: a) the offended party is a virgin; b) she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age; c) the offender has sexual intercourse with her; d) there is abuse of authority, of confidence or of relationship. If the offender is the brother or ascendant of the victim, elements (a) and (b) are dispensed with. Parenthetically, the relationship of the offender and the victim must be by consanguinity but need not be legitimate.
While qualified seduction is not necessarily included in rape, one who is charged with rape may be found guilty of qualified seduction when the verified complaint for rape contains allegations which aver, and embodies the elements of, the crime of seduction. The complaint and the information in this case has sufficiently alleged those elements, i.e. that appellant has had carnal knowledge of his 12-year old daughter, Ailyn, twice on 13 June 1998 in an apparent abuse of filial relationship. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated – these being conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. The Court, in U.S. vs. Lin San, has held:
“From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the Information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of the pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense, he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, `Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?’ not, `Did you commit a crime named murder?’ If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.”