On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that “while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).”
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because “DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.”
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that “the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.”
A year later, in People v. Janson, we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because “doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!”
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing…
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar, we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
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In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from one’s mouth and the tracing of one’s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In Jimenez v. Cañizares, we even authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar, are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres, where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance. Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:
§ 516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signator’s filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the “date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding” shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a party’s challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child’s paternity and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither signator’s legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the child’s birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the parents’ acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:
§532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the court’s own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W., a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G., the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the child’s father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.’s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement…(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child’s access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. (“In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to ‘general acceptance in less than a decade’”). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the child’s biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man–the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigan’s Paternity law have included the use of DNA testing:
§722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.
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(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin’s father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin’s father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W., the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson, decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundson’s child through DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The Court said “(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson’s position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.”
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services, another case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available “when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by “grave abuse of discretion”:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.